诱惑侦查及其规制

洪碧华


[摘要]：近年来，侦查机关经常使用诱惑侦查手段破案。但此举缺乏法律依据，基本上处于无法可依状态，又容易侵犯人权，法学界褒贬不一，主要有肯定和反对两种观点。本文持肯定的观点，探讨诱惑侦查的合法性、存废及法律规制问题。
[关键词]：侦查手段、诱惑侦查、法律规制
随着社会犯罪率不断上升，为了加大打击力度，侦查机关频频使用诱惑侦查手段。一般做法是，侦查人员根据已经掌握的线索接触嫌疑人，伪装要买毒品、宿娼或行贿，在对方同意并开始交易时将嫌疑人抓获。这种特殊的侦查手段，已被世界各国警察所采用，许多国家的立法也有规定。我国司法实践中也大量应用，据广西桂林某区检察院统计，该院2001年至2002年6月受理的毒品、假币犯罪案件中，有80.85％的案件运用了诱惑侦查手段，大大提高了案件的侦破率和取证的准确度，效果十分显著，但缺乏法律依据。理论界曾经展开过热烈的讨论，大致形成的共识是，可以允许合理使用“诱惑侦查”，但应当禁止诱人犯罪。就是说警方原则上不能设置陷阱，陷害忠良。
一、诱惑侦查及其合法性问题
所谓诱惑侦查，是指侦查人员或其协助者为侦破某些极具隐蔽性的案件，根据犯罪嫌疑人的意向提供其实施的条件和机会，或有意创造某种诱发犯罪的情境，待其实施犯罪或自我暴露时，当场将其拘捕的一种特殊侦查手段。类似古代成语故事“欲擒故纵”。
诱惑侦查有三个特征：一是诱使者必须是侦查机关或其代理人，这是诱惑侦查与教唆犯罪的根本区别。二是诱惑侦查是通过采取种种诱惑性手段，如提供实施犯罪的种种客观便利条件等，引诱侦查对象进行犯罪。采取诱惑性手段，是诱惑侦查与其它侦查手段区别的特征。三是被诱惑者的整个犯罪过程处于侦查机关的严密监控之下，犯罪行为实施时或结果发生后，就是被诱惑者被捕之时，所有的调查取证工作也几乎同时结束，而且往往是在犯罪现场或者人赃并获。这是诱惑侦查的最大优点。
关于诱惑侦查合法与否，法学界观点不一。肯定论认为：第一，诱惑侦查作为一种低成本、高效率的侦查手段，在我国当前司法资源匮乏、侦查技术落后的背景下，对于打击犯罪具有重要的意义。第二，诱惑侦查可以有效打击刑事犯罪，一些严重的犯罪，如卖淫、贩卖毒品、贿赂、赌博等，运用常规手段难以破获，因为警方难以获取有效的指控证据。因此，诱惑侦查成为侦破案件的唯一选择。第三，诱惑侦查虽然未出自法律的明文规定或明示支持，却是法律所默许的。《刑诉法》第八十九条对侦查行为的几种主要方式作出规定，而对侦查机关采取什么侦查手段，没有加以限制。从全球情况看，上世纪60年代来，刑事犯罪发生了巨大变化，贩毒、贿赂、伪造货币、洗钱等“无被害人之犯罪”日趋隐蔽化、复杂化，往往实施犯罪时大都有周密的计划及很强的反侦查能力，对社会公众的压力比一般犯罪要大得多。面对这种情形，使用一般侦查技术手段往往不能破获犯罪案件，侦查线索的发现和犯罪人的拘捕都极为困难，最终使这些犯罪人得以逃脱法网。对付智能化、隐蔽化、组织化犯罪而采用特殊手段是客观现实的要求。
否定论则认为：第一，使用诱惑侦查潜藏着公共政策和价值导向的风险。司法机关为了打击犯罪，必须采取必要的侦查手段，但如果它突破了打击犯罪之底线，不是抑制犯罪而是制造犯罪，显然与其初衷背道而驰；更重要是，由此造成的对公民基本权利的侵犯，造成消极的社会影响。第二，诱惑侦查具有违法嫌疑，体现在四个方面：①刑事司法的目的是制裁已然犯罪，维护社会稳定。诱惑侦查却是以种种诱惑手段去诱人犯罪，这实际上是在制造犯罪，扩大犯罪。②我国刑诉法的任务是保障无罪的人不受刑事追究，保护公民的人身权利，财产权利，民主权利和其它权利，诱惑侦查却有可能使一个无辜公民遭受刑事惩罚。③诱人犯罪的侦查人员因其公权行为而得以免责，就算违法行政，给相对人造成损失，也由国家赔偿，这违背了罪责自负原则，给滥用职权、感情用事、公报私仇等留下余地。④刑事诉讼程序的启动应以犯罪事实的发生为前提，即先有犯罪事实，后有立案侦查，诱惑侦查即是先有侦查行为，后有犯罪事实，违反了刑诉法规定的追究犯罪的程序和步骤。第三，诱惑侦查在实践中被大量应用，其中不乏陷人于罪之举，而且，不能排除诱惑侦查在使用中有利益驱动的原因，如设圈套抓赌抓嫖抓娼等，大都意在罚款，这违背了立法宗旨和执法本意，罚款的目的在于教育群众遵纪守法，而不是为了单位创收或个人福利。
二、 诱惑侦查的存与废
综上所述，诱惑侦查论争的实质是：如何在侦查犯罪的必要性与维持个人的法律安全之间寻求平衡?一对是打击犯罪与保护人权；二对是维护个人利益与维护社会利益。如果从打击犯罪和维护社会利益的价值定位出发，那么，使用诱惑侦查手段就是正当的；如果从保护人权，特别是保护犯罪嫌疑人个人权益出发，那么，禁止使用诱惑侦查手段就具有了正当性。然而，我们应当看到，侦查手段必须具备有效性。强制性侦查手段如搜查等都不同程度地存在侵犯人权的威胁，而这恰恰是它们赖以发挥威力之基础。
对诱惑侦查的存与废，应当立足于司法资源、社会治安形势、公民权利意识等国情背景作综合考虑，不能仅仅着眼于理想主义的公民权利自由保障。社会契约说认为，自由和安全之间存在着冲突和矛盾，个人不可能享受完全的自由和安全。从权利角度看，维护安全所需的公权和保障自由所需的私权犹如天平上的两端，而影响其平衡的则是社会治安形势，高犯罪率的社会必然要求公民将更多的自由让渡与国家，这就意味着公权的扩张，但从根本上说是为了更好地保障公民权益和自由。1970年美国反黑法和意大利采取“双轨制”对付黑手党就是例证。越来越严重的黑社会犯罪，迫使政府改变刑事政策，甚至违背法治原则采取特殊措施。因此，诱惑侦查作为公权执法与公民犯罪斗争的结果，应当受到批判地肯定和尊重。
即使在法治发达国家，诱惑侦查也经常运用，因为它确实行之有效。美国警察常常使用秘密手段破案，包括化装侦查、诱惑侦查。例如，在1980年初，美国联邦调查局进行一项代号“阿伯斯卡姆”行为。某特工化装成阿拉伯石油大亨向国会议员行贿，结果使数名议员犯了受贿罪。意大利警方曾派“线人”去见米兰养老院院长基耶萨，因承包工程，当面送给该院长一笔钱（钞票的号码事先已经作了登记）。后者将贿金放进办公桌抽屉后，警方一拥而入，人赃俱获。基氏被捕后，交代了其所在的执政党中高级官员从政府工程中大肆受贿的部分情况，意大利反贪风暴由此拉开序幕，一大批高官落马。
诱惑侦查是一柄双刃剑，既有其合理性，又存有弊端，如何使诱惑侦查在一定限度内依法进行，关键在于对这种手段进行必要的限制，以阻却其实施中的违法性，消除其弊端。如德国法律规定适用“诱惑侦查”必须满足：①必须有“足够的事实根据”表明存在重大犯罪行为。②只限于毒品、武器交易、伪造货币或有价证券、有关国家安全方面的犯罪，或者是职业性的、持续性的犯罪，或者有组织实施的重大犯罪。③只限于采用其他方式侦查将十分困难的情形。日本也规定，只有在被侵害法益很大，侦查比较困难的无被害人犯罪中，才可以适用“诱惑侦查”。
三、诱惑侦查的法律规制
关于诱惑侦查，我国立法基本上处于空白状态，无法可依，急需修改《刑诉法》第八十九条，从法律上作出明确具体的规定，包括对诱惑侦查的概念、使用目的、范围、适用条件、程序等做出相应的规制。
（一）诱惑侦查的界定和使用目的的规制
诱惑侦查的概念可以这样界定：诱惑侦查，是指侦查机关为了侦破罪案，以种种诱惑性手段，引诱侦查对象进行犯罪，待犯罪行为实施时或结果发生后，拘捕被诱惑者的特殊侦查手段。同时，对诱惑侦查的使用目的进行规范：诱惑侦查用于证实不确定犯罪嫌疑人所犯罪行，确定并缉拿犯罪嫌疑人。
（二）诱惑侦查的适用条件和范围的规制
刑事诉讼的过程，采取诱惑侦查手段所获得证据与证据的证明力存在着直接关系，因此，人民检察院在审查时，对诱惑侦查的范围和使用条件应严格监督，防止其被滥用。具体措施如下：
１、诱惑侦查的实施应当具备合理依据，即有线索或证据表明某人或某地区有实施或发生罪案的嫌疑，但是尚无充分证据足以证明，而侦察人员的行为正是为了防止正在进行特定的犯罪行为。
２、诱惑侦查只能用于无被害人之犯罪和组织化犯罪( 关于无被害人之犯罪和组织化犯罪的内涵和外延，可以司法解释形式作补充阐述)。
３、诱惑侦查只能适用于有刑事行为能力和刑事责任努力的正常人，未成年人，精神病人包括间歇性精神病人除外。
４、诱惑侦查的实施，必须是在其它侦查手段都已使用而无法奏效情况下的最后选择，并且应尽量避免一切足以造成危险、侮辱人格或者有伤风化的行为。
（三）诱惑侦察的程序控制
由于在适用诱惑侦查的范围和条件的判断可能因人而异，为防止诱惑侦查的滥用，应设立严格统一的诱惑侦查适用程序。
1、法律应对适用诱惑侦查的案件设立一个审批程序，当侦查人员认为需要对侦查对象使用诱惑侦查时，应由承办人员写出书面请示报告，详细陈述采取诱惑侦查的根据、理由，由主管领导、负责人审核批准，最后交由承办人员严格遵照执行。
2、主管领导、负责人在审查诱惑侦查的申请时，除必须具备法律要件外，还应符合以下规定：①嫌疑人必须明知其将实施违法行为的违法性；②嫌疑人所实施违法事件的性质本身，不具有任何为实施诱惑侦查行为而为的不当情节。
3、实施诱惑侦查时，由检察机关事前备案和对整个侦查活动进行监督，检察机关如果认为诱惑侦查违反程序，或者可能诱发无辜者犯罪，可以建议侦查关终止诱惑侦查。
当然，只要立法机关做出明确具体的规定，赋予侦查人员对严重犯罪拥有诱惑侦查权，那么，诱惑侦查作为一种低成本、高效率的侦查手段，在我国当前司法资源匮乏、侦查技术落后的背景下，对于打击犯罪将具有重要现实的意义。




参 考 文 献

[1] 王新环：《法律，如何面对“警察圈套”》，《检察日报》1999年9月22日
[2] 李永红：《侦查陷井的法律规制》，《人民检察》2001年第1期
[3] 谢光永：《国外侦查陷井探微》，《检察日报》2000年12月13日
[4] 马 跃：《美、日有关诱惑侦查的法理及论争之概观》，《法学》1998年第11期
[5] 王世洲：《警察圈套初探》，《法学与实践》1992年第2期
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Chapter V
Guidelines for Interpretation
of the WTO Covered Agreements


OUTLINE

I Introduction
II Application of Arts. 31, 32 of the Vienna Convention
III WTO Rules on Conflicts: Effective Interpretation
IV The Status of Legitimate Expectations in Interpretation



I Introduction
According to Art. 11 of the DSU, the panel's role is to “make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability and conformity with the relevant covered agreements”. In the previous chapter, we have examined the general standard of review labeled as “an objective assessment” regarding “the facts of the case”; clearly, for panels to fulfil appropriately their functions as designated in Art. 11 of the DSU, it is also indiscerptible to make such an objective assessment of “the applicability and conformity with the relevant covered agreements”. Therefore, the interpretation issue of the covered agreements arises. In this section, the author will scrutinize guidelines for interpretation applied under the WTO jurisprudence.
To resolve a particular dispute, before addressing the parties' arguments in detail, it is clearly necessary and appropriate to clarify the general issues concerning the interpretation of the relevant provisions and their application to the parties' claims. However, the complex nature of the covered agreements has given rise to difficulties in interpretation.
As noted previously, GATT/WTO jurisprudence should not be viewed in isolation from general principles developed in international law or most jurisdictions; and according to Art. 3.2 of the DSU, panels are bound by the “customary rules of interpretation of public international law” in their examination of the covered agreements. A number of recent adopted reports have repeatedly referred, as interpretative guidelines, to “customary rules of interpretation of public international law” as embodied in the text of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (‘Vienna Convention’), especially in its Arts. 31, 32. It is in accordance with these rules of treaty interpretation that panels or the Appellate Body have frequently examined the WTO provisions at issue, on the basis of the ordinary meaning of the terms of those provisions in their context, in the light of the object and purpose of the covered agreements and the WTO Agreement. These Vienna Convention articles provide as follows:

“Art. 31: General Rule of Interpretation
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.

Art. 32 Supplementary Means of Interpretation
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.”

II Application of Arts. 31, 32 of the Vienna Convention
Pursuant to Art. 31.1 of the Vienna Convention, the duty of a treaty interpreter is to determine the meaning of a term in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the term in its context and in light of the object and purpose of the treaty. As noted by the Appellate Body in its Report on Japan-Alcoholic Beverages (DS8/DS10/DS11), “Article 31 of provides that the words of the treaty form the foundation for the interpretive process: ‘interpretation must be based above all upon the text of the treaty’. The provisions of the treaty are to be given their ordinary meaning in their context. The object and purpose of the treaty are also to be taken into account in determining the meaning of its provisions”. And in US ? Shrimps (DS58), the Appellate Body accordingly states: “A treaty interpreter must begin with, and focus upon, the text of the particular provision to be interpreted. It is in the words constituting that provision, read in their context, that the object and purpose of the states parties to the treaty must first be sought. Where the meaning imparted by the text itself is equivocal or inconclusive, or where confirmation of the correctness of the reading of the text itself is desired, light from the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole may usefully be sought.”
More specifically, the Panel in US-Sections 301-310 (DS152) rules that: “Text, context and object-and-purpose correspond to well established textual, systemic and teleological methodologies of treaty interpretation, all of which typically come into play when interpreting complex provisions in multilateral treaties. For pragmatic reasons the normal usage, and we will follow this usage, is to start the interpretation from the ordinary meaning of the ‘raw’ text of the relevant treaty provisions and then seek to construe it in its context and in the light of the treaty's object and purpose. However, the elements referred to in Article 31 - text, context and object-and-purpose as well as good faith - are to be viewed as one holistic rule of interpretation rather than a sequence of separate tests to be applied in a hierarchical order. Context and object-and-purpose may often appear simply to confirm an interpretation seemingly derived from the ‘raw’ text. In reality it is always some context, even if unstated, that determines which meaning is to be taken as ‘ordinary’ and frequently it is impossible to give meaning, even ‘ordinary meaning’, without looking also at object-and-purpose. As noted by the Appellate Body: ‘Article 31 of the Vienna Convention provides that the words of the treaty form the foundation for the interpretive process: 'interpretation must be based above all upon the text of the treaty'’. It adds, however, that ‘[t]he provisions of the treaty are to be given their ordinary meaning in their context. The object and purpose of the treaty are also to be taken into account in determining the meaning of its provisions’.” 1
In sum, as noted by the Panel in Canada-Automotive Industry (DS139/DS142), “understanding of these rules of interpretation is that, even though the text of a term is the starting-point for any interpretation, the meaning of a term cannot be found exclusively in that text; in seeking the meaning of a term, we also have to take account of its context and to consider the text of the term in light of the object and purpose of the treaty. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention explicitly refers to the ‘ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their [the terms'] context and in the light of its [the treaty's] object and purpose’. The three elements referred to in Article 31 - text, context and object and purpose - are to be viewed as one integrated rule of interpretation rather than a sequence of separate tests to be applied in a hierarchical order. Of course, context and object and purpose may simply confirm the textual meaning of a term. In many cases, however, it is impossible to give meaning, even ‘ordinary meaning’, without looking also at the context and/or object and purpose”. 2
With regard to Art. 32 of the Vienna Convention, it is repeatedly ruled that, “[t]he application of these rules in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention will usually allow a treaty interpreter to establish the meaning of a term. However, if after applying Article 31 the meaning of the term remains ambiguous or obscure, or leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable, Article 32 allows a treaty interpreter to have recourse to ‘... supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion’. With regard to 'the circumstances of [the] conclusion' of a treaty, this permits, in appropriate cases, the examination of the historical background against which the treaty was negotiated.” 3
As a whole, under the WTO jurisprudence, with regard to the dispute among the parties over the appropriate legal analysis to be applied, as general principles or guidelines of interpretation, it is often begun with Art. 3.2 of the DSU. To go further, as noted by the Panel in Japan-Alcoholic Beverages, “the ‘customary rules of interpretation of public international law’ are those incorporated in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). GATT panels have previously interpreted the GATT in accordance with the VCLT. The Panel noted that Article 3:2 DSU in fact codifies this previously-established practice”. Consequently, “the Panel concluded that the starting point of an interpretation of an international treaty, such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, in accordance with Article 31 VCLT, is the wording of the treaty. The wording should be interpreted in its context and in the light of the object and the purpose of the treaty as a whole and subsequent practice and agreements should be taken into account. Recourse to supplementary means of interpretation should be made exceptionally only under the conditions specified in Article 32 VCLT”. 4
In short, it is may be the case that, it is generally considered that the fundamental rules of treaty interpretation set out in Arts. 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention have attained the status of rules of customary international law. In recent years, the jurisprudence of the Appellate Body and WTO panels has become one of the richest sources from which to receive guidance on their application.
III WTO Rules on Conflicts: Effective Interpretation
The Panel Report on Turkey-Textile and Clothing Products (DS34) states concerning the conflicts issue that: 5
“As a general principle, WTO obligations are cumulative and Members must comply with all of them at all times unless there is a formal ‘conflict’ between them. This flows from the fact that the WTO Agreement is a ‘Single Undertaking’. On the definition of conflict, it should be noted that: ‘… a conflict of law-making treaties arises only where simultaneous compliance with the obligations of different instruments is impossible. ... There is no conflict if the obligations of one instrument are stricter than, but not incompatible with, those of another, or if it is possible to comply with the obligations of one instrument by refraining from exercising a privilege or discretion accorded by another’.
This principle, also referred to by Japan in its third party submission, is in conformity with the public international law presumption against conflicts which was applied by the Appellate Body in Canada - Periodicals and in EC - Bananas III, when dealing with potential overlapping coverage of GATT 1994 and GATS, and by the panel in Indonesia - Autos, in respect of the provisions of Article III of GATT, the TRIMs Agreement and the SCM Agreement. In Guatemala - Cement, the Appellate Body when discussing the possibility of conflicts between the provisions of the Anti-dumping Agreement and the DSU, stated: ‘A special or additional provision should only be found to prevail over a provision of the DSU in a situation where adherence to the one provision will lead to a violation of the other provision, that is, in the case of a conflict between them’.
We recall the Panel's finding in Indonesia - Autos, a dispute where Indonesia was arguing that the measures under examination were subsidies and therefore the SCM Agreement being lex specialis, was the only ‘applicable law’ (to the exclusion of other WTO provisions): ‘14.28 In considering Indonesia's defence that there is a general conflict between the provisions of the SCM Agreement and those of Article III of GATT, and consequently that the SCM Agreement is the only applicable law, we recall first that in public international law there is a presumption against conflict. This presumption is especially relevant in the WTO context since all WTO agreements, including GATT 1994 which was modified by Understandings when judged necessary, were negotiated at the same time, by the same Members and in the same forum. In this context we recall the principle of effective interpretation pursuant to which all provisions of a treaty (and in the WTO system all agreements) must be given meaning, using the ordinary meaning of words.’
In light of this general principle, we will consider whether Article XXIV authorizes measures which Articles XI and XIII of GATT and Article 2.4 of the ATC otherwise prohibit. In view of the presumption against conflicts, as recognized by panels and the Appellate Body, we bear in mind that to the extent possible, any interpretation of these provisions that would lead to a conflict between them should be avoided.”
It is clearly implied by the ruling above that, in the WTO system, any interpretation of the covered agreements that would lead to a conflict between them should be avoided. In this respect, as to WTO rules of conflicts, in the context that all WTO agreements were negotiated “at the same time, by the same Members and in the same forum”, the principle of effective interpretation is recalled. What a principle is it?
As ruled by the Panel in Japan-Alcoholic Beverage (DS8/DS10/DS11), effective interpretation is a principle “whereby all provisions of a treaty must be, to the extent possible, given their full meaning so that parties to such a treaty can enforce their rights and obligations effectively…. this principle of interpretation prevents [the panel] from reaching a conclusion on the claims … or the defense …, or on the related provisions invoked by the parties, that would lead to a denial of either party's rights or obligations.” 6 This ruling is upheld by the Appellate Body when ruling that, “[a] fundamental tenet of treaty interpretation flowing from the general rule of interpretation set out in Article 31 is the principle of effectiveness (ut res magis valeat quam pereat). In United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, we noted that ‘[o]ne of the corollaries of the ‘general rule of interpretation’ in the Vienna Convention is that interpretation must give meaning and effect to all the terms of the treaty. An interpreter is not free to adopt a reading that would result in reducing whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility’.” 7